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Abstract
The present paper scrutinizes the logical foundation of Marx’s dialectic analy-
sis of the evolving money economy. The minimalistic frame of reference is
thereby given with the set of structural axioms. It turns out, first, that the com-
monplace notion of exploitation has to be replaced by crossover exploitation
among capitalists and workers; second, that the concept of surplus value can-
not explain the existence and magnitude of overall profits; finally, that the real
shares of output are determined in the spheres of income and expenditure and
not, as classical, Marxian and neoclassical economists unanimously maintain,
in the sphere of production.
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It has been argued that it is impossible to separate the scientific content of Capital
from its political intention (Mandel, 1990, p. 16). It is possible, though, to identify
its logical foundation. If it can be demonstrated that the basic propositions are
contradictory or insufficient any further question about scientific and political
content falls flat. For this procedure one has Marx’s invitation: ‘I welcome every
opinion based on scientific criticism’ (Marx, 1990a, p. 93).
The critique of fundamental assumptions opens the way to the real question.
Marx’s objective was to discover the ‘laws of motion’ of the market system. This
coincides with the objective of standard economics.
It is good to have [the technically best study of equilibria], but perhaps
the time has now come to see whether it can serve in an analysis of how
economies behave. The most intellectually exciting question of our
subject remains: is it true that the pursuit of private interest produces
not chaos but coherence, and if so, how is it done? (Hahn, 1984, p.
102)
Marx relied on the method of materialistic dialectic. In fact he insisted:
. . . that he was the first person to have applied this method to the study
of economic problems. . . . Marx specified this use of the dialectical
method as the differentia specifica of Capital, which distinguished it
from all other economic analyses. (Mandel, 1990, p. 17)
Each theory, and Marx’s theory is no exception, rests on a small set of fundamental
assumptions.
It is no accident that Marx starts Capital Volume I with an analysis
neither of the ‘capitalist mode of production’, nor of capital, nor of
wage-labour, nor even of the relations between wage-labour and capital.
For it is impossible to analyse any of these basic concepts or categories
. . . scientifically, totally and adequately without a previous analysis of
value, exchange-value and surplus-value. (Mandel, 1990, p. 13)
Conclusions about the functioning and development of the economy are prefigured
in these assumptions.
Just as surplus-value and capital emerge logically from an analysis
from value and exchange-value, so too does the capitalist mode of pro-
duction emerge historically from the growth of commodity production
. . . (Mandel, 1990, p. 13-14), original emphasis
Standard economics, too, rests on the theory of value (Debreu, 1959). The crucial
difference is that Marx relies on the dialectical method for further elaborating his
theory, while standard economics relies on the axiomatic method (Stigum, 1991, p.
4). The common denominator is the concept of value, yet valuation is essentially
subjective. Cournot early on realized that assumptions about human cognition
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and behavior (rational or otherwise) are too weak to carry an extended theoretical
superstructure.
The marginalistic theory of value rests on an explicit set of behavioral axioms.
This formal transparency is preferable to Marx’s verbal presentation. The main
thesis of the present paper is, though, that human behavior does not yield to the
axiomatic method, yet the axiomatization of the money economy’s fundamental
structure is feasible. The crucial point is not axiomatization per se but the real world
content of axioms. The following inquiry applies the objective structural axiom
set to Marx’s concept of surplus value which he regarded as his main theoretical
discovery (Mandel, 1990, p. 51).
The case for structural axiomatization has been made at length elsewhere
(Kakarot-Handtke, 2011a, 2011c, and 2011b), thus we can start without further
methodological preliminaries. The minimalistic formal frame that constitutes the
pure consumption economy is set up in section 1. Thereby the premature specifica-
tion of behavioral assumptions is forestalled. Then, in sections 2 to 5 the structural
interrelation of profits and wages is formally established. This clarifies the origi-
nation of profit, the relation between profit and the distribution of output, and why
myopic agents misinterpret the relation between profits and wages. In section 6
commonplace exploitation is replaced by the concept of crossover exploitation. In
section 7 the surplus value is consistently derived from the structural axiom set.
Thereby it turns out that Marx’s concept is redundant and that, by consequence, his
theory does not contain an explanation of profits. By clinging to Ricardo’s profit
theory Marx failed to pierce through the appearances and could not get to the core
of the problem of exploitation. Section 8 concludes.
1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have
for the time being one world economy, one firm, and one product (the consistent
differentiation of the axiom set is carried out in Kakarot-Handtke, 2011b).
Total income of the household sector Y is the sum of wage income, i.e. the
product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the product
of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
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Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X.
C = PX |t (3)
The economic principle, known as Occam’s razor in methodology, demands
that the number of basic propositions is minimized.
The attempt is made to collect all the assumptions, which are needed,
but no more, to form the apex of the system. They are usually called
the ‘axioms’ (or ‘postulates’, or primitive ‘propositions’; no claim of
truth is implied in the term ‘axiom’ as here used). (Popper, 1980, p.
71)
It is a misunderstanding either to accept or to reject axioms as ‘universal truths’
(Davidson, 1998, p. 67), Dow (2003, p. 552). In fact, ‘no claim of truth is implied’.
A set of axioms is either agreed upon as a tentative formal starting point or rejected
out of hand. This, though, in turn entails: ‘that we are forced to lay our cards on the
table so that all can see our premises’ (Samuelson, 1952, p. 64). Then, the relative
merits of different sets of axioms can be assessed by testing whether the conclusions
drawn from them have a counterpart in reality: ‘Anything else is pure filibustering’
(Schumpeter, 1994, p. 577).
Our minimalist starting point represents the pure consumption economy, i.e.
no investment expenditures, no foreign trade, and no government. The economic
meaning is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms. What deserves mention
is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not
of wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit are quite different things
that have to be thoroughly kept apart.
The full logical and factual implications of the structural axiom set – and, for
that matter, of any other set of foundational propositions as well – are far from
obvious. They have to be consistently unfolded. Thereby it turns out that some
implications are counter-intuitive, that is, from the standpoint of parochial realism.
This holds, as we shall presently see, for profits. Yet, as Marx nicely put it:
. . . all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things
directly coincided with their essence . . . (Marx, 1990b, p. 956)
2 Profit
The business sector’s financial profit Qfi in period t is defined with (4) as the
difference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with
consumption expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW1:
1 Profits from changes in the value of financial and non-financial assets are neglected here. One
member of the latter class is the stock of products which may change with regard to quantity and
valuation price if the product market is not cleared in successive periods. This case is excluded in the
following by the condition rX=1.
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Q f i ≡C−YW ≡ PX−WL ⇐ YW ≡WL |t (4)
For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption expenditures C
have in the simplest case to be greater than wage income YW. So that profit comes
into existence in the pure consumption economy the household sector must run a
deficit at least in one period. This in turn makes the inclusion of the financial sector
mandatory. An economic theory that does not include at least one bank that supports
the concomitant credit expansion (see Kakarot-Handtke, 2011d, p. 4) cannot capture
the essential features of the market economy. Marx’s money-commodity theory is
not ideally suited for this purpose (Bellofiore and Realfonzo, 2003, p. 206).
It needs hardly emphasis that in the investment economy the process of profit
generation appears more complex. This does not affect the essence of profit but
simply removes the formal necessity that the households have to incur a deficit to
get the economy going2. This is then done by the investing business sector. It is not
advisable, though, to tackle the complexities of the investment economy before the
pure consumption economy is fully understood.
3 Appearances of profit
From (4) and (1) follows for the relation of profit and distributed profit:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD ⇐ YD ≡ DN |t (5)
The determinants of profit look essentially different depending on the perspec-
tive. For the firm price, quantity, wage rate, and employment in (4) are all important;
under the broader perspective of (5) these variables play no role at all. Since (4)
and (5) are formally equivalent both perspectives are not only valid, but indeed
indispensable for a comprehensive analysis.
Profit is not connected to a factor input. So far, we have labor input as the sole
factor of production and wage income as the corresponding factor remuneration.
Since the factor capital is nonexistent in the pure consumption economy, profit
cannot be assigned to it in functional terms. And since profit cannot be counted
as factor income there is no place for it in the theory of income distribution. The
income definition: total income = wage income + profit, e.g. (Kaldor, 1956, p. 95)
or (Keynes, 1973, p. 23), is commonsensical, but theoretically indefensible.
The individual firm is blind to the structural relationship given by (5). On the
firm’s level profit is therefore subjectively interpreted as a reward for innovation
or superior management skills or higher efficiency or toughness on wages or for
risk taking or capitalizing on market imperfections or as the result of monopolistic
2 When the purchase of long lived consumption goods, e.g. houses, is correctly subsumed under
consumption expenditures there arises no practical problem with regard to collateral for the banking
industry and a sound credit expansion may proceed for an indefinite time in the pure consumption
economy.
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practices. There is a lot of empirical plausibility in this subjective interpretations.
Seen under the broader perspective, though, business does not ‘make’ profit, it
redistributes profit. The case is perfectly clear when there is only one firm. It is a
matter of indifference whether the firm’s management thinks that it needs profit to
cover risks or to finance growth or whether it realizes the profit maximum or not.
If the consumption expenditures C are equal to income Y and distributed profit YD
is zero in (5), profit will invariably be zero. The existence and magnitude of total
profit is neither explicable by the subjectivist marginal principle nor by the labour
theory of value (see Kakarot-Handtke, 2011b, pp. 7-10), and it is beyond common
sense as well.
The barter-economic notion of surplus stands in no relation to profit as de-
termined by (4). Neither is the neoclassical equilibrium condition, profit rate =
marginal productivity of capital, applicable in the pure consumption economy, be-
cause we have profit but no capital. And, since profit and capital must not be treated
like Siamese Twins, as they have by the classics and Marx in particular, the tendency
of the profit rate to fall is also in need of a thorough revision.
In the general case, profit or loss depends on consumer spending and profit
distribution. If in the limiting case distributed profit is zero, then we have three
logical alternatives: C<Y, C=Y or C>Y. The first alternative entails a loss for the
business sector as a whole; the second means zero profit, and only the third leads
to profit which in turn is the indispensable condition for a reproducible economy.
Hence the real question is how the market economy creates the conditions from
within that are necessary for its further self-reproduction, vulgo, survival.
The profit definition has another important implication. There is no real residual
that corresponds to the nominal residual profit. Real (O, X) and nominal (Y, C) flows
are to some degree independent. Profit belongs entirely to the nominal sphere, in a
real model it cannot exist.
Distributed profit, in contrast, can have a real counterpart. If the product market
is cleared the whole output is shared between wage earners and the receivers of
distributed profit according to their respective expenditure ratios (for the details see
Kakarot-Handtke, 2011d, pp. 11-12).
Under the condition C=Y profit Qfi must, as a corollary of (5), be equal to
distributed profit YD. The fundamental difference between the two variables is not
an issue in this limiting case. The equality of profit and distributed profit is an
implicit feature of equilibrium models. These have no counterpart in reality.
4 The overall profit ratio
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of the
identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. To the definitions in
(4) and (5) three structural ratios are added now. With (6) the expenditure ratio rE,
the sales ratio rX, and the distributed profit ratio rD is defined:
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ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ YDYW |t (6)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical
context of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
From (5), the first axiom (1), and the definitions (6) one gets for total profits:
Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t (7)
To get rid of all absolute magnitudes the profit ratio rQ is defined with (8) and
this gives a succinct summary of the structural interrelations of the profit ratio, the
expenditure ratio, and the distributed profit ratio for the business sector as a whole:
ρQ ≡ ρE (1+ρD)−1 ⇐ ρQ ≡ Q f iYW |t (8)
The overall profit ratio rQ is positive if the expenditure ratio rE is >1 or the
distributed profit ratio rD is >0, or both. Neither the organic composition of capital,
for example, nor the degree of monopolization on both the product and the labor
market plays any role. And if the wage rate, which is a component of the distributed
profit ratio rD, and the dividend always move in lockstep, then neither of them
affects the overall profit ratio of the economy under consideration.
5 Profits and wages
For two firms profits in each period t are derived from (4) as:
Q f i1 ≡ P1X1−W1L1
Q f i2 ≡ P2X2−W2L2
Q f i ≡ Q f i1 +Q f i2 |t
(9)
In order to get the direct relation between profit and the wage rate, all interme-
diate variables are now eliminated. To restrict the analysis to the simplest case two
conditions are applied first: the market price P and the productivity R are equal for
both firms (for the effects of productivity differentials see Kakarot-Handtke, 2011c,
pp. 10-12):
P1 = P2 = P R1 = R2 = R |t (10)
The uniform market price follows from the axioms and definitions as:
P =
ρE
ρX
(1+ρD)
W
R
|t (11)
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The price depends on the expenditure ratio rE, the sales ratio rX, the distributed
profit ratio rD, and unit wage costs W/R. When the wage rates are not equal in both
firms, the average wage rate W is given by:
W =W1
L1
L
+W2
L2
L
|t (12)
For the elementary case of two firms with equal employment Lh=L/2 this gives,
in conjunction with the introduction of the wage ratio rW:
W =
W2
2
(ρW +1)
if L1 = L2 = Lh and ρW ≡ W1W2 |t
(13)
Under the conditions of market clearing, i.e. rX=1, the market clearing price P*
follows then from (11) as:
P∗ = ρE (1+ρD)
W2
2R
(ρW +1) if ρX = 1 |t (14)
To simplify matters further, profit distribution is here completely taken out of
the picture (it is dealt with at length in Kakarot-Handtke, 2011d, pp. 8-10):
P∗ = ρE
W2
2R
(ρW +1) if ρX = 1 and ρD = 0 |t (15)
The market clearing price now depends only on the expenditure ratio, the overall
productivity, and the relation of wage rates in both firms. Inserting (15) in (9) gives
finally the respective profits in dependence of the respective wage rates:
Q f i1 ≡W1Lh
(
ρE
2ρW
(ρW +1)−1
)
|t
Q f i2 ≡W2Lh
(ρE
2
(ρW +1)−1
)
|t
(16)
The profit of each firm depends positively on the own wage rate if the overall
expenditure ratio is rE>1 and negatively if the relation of the own wage rate and the
wage rate of the other firm is rW>1 as visualized in Figure 1.
The profit of firm1 remains zero if both ratios are unity and the wage rate W1
rises (here from 10 to 15). The profit rises with the firm’s own wage rate W1 if the
expenditure ratio of the households is greater than unity (1.1 in Figure 1a) and the
other firm’s wage rate moves in lockstep, i.e. rW=1. That is, wages come back in
some proportion via the product market and this proportion depends on the actual
expenditure ratio. Hence a wage increase in firm 1 does not necessarily lead to a
profit decrease. This happens only if the expenditure ratio is below unity (0.9 in
Figure 1a). When we regard an expenditure ratio of unity as the normal case, then it
is immaterial whether the wage rate in firm1 rises or falls as long as the other firm
moves in lockstep.
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Figure 1: The Relation Between Wage Rate Changes and Profit Changes
9
If the expenditure ratio is unity and firm1 moves ahead with a wage increase,
i.e. rW>1, then its profit falls as shown in Figure 1b. Conversely, the profit in firm1
rises and falls with the wage rate in firm2.
It is parochial realism to maintain that the relation between profit and wage rate is
by necessity negative. What is true for a small firm and an isolated change becomes
false when generalized. Recall that we have given each firm a share of 50 percent
(Lh=L/2) of the economy. Hence each firm experiences the repercussions of its own
actions and this makes nonsense of ceteris paribus and isolated profit maximization.
These repercussions may become very small for the ith firm, depending on Li/L, but
they never become zero. While it is commonsensical to neglect minor repercussions
in practice, it is inadmissible to omit them in theory, because exactly these negligible
repercussions prohibit generalization. The small repercussions of many firms taken
together are not negligible.
With an expenditure ratio of rE=1 and equal wage rates in both firms rW=1 the
profit is zero in each firm. If firm1 reduces the wage rate by half, then rW=1/2 and
profit Qfi1 in (16) rises as Figure 1b shows. With the wage cut total wage income
falls. Since the expenditure ratio is unity consumption expenditures reduce by the
same amount and therefore the market clearing price falls. At this new price firm2
now incurs a loss with unaltered wage costs. Since overall profits are zero because
of rE=1, this loss is equal to the profit of firm1.
The respective profit ratios, which are defined in analogy to the overall ratio (8),
follow from (16) as:
ρQ1 ≡ ρE (ρW +1)2ρW −1 ⇐ ρQ1 ≡
Q f i1
W1Lh
ρQ2 ≡ ρE (ρW +1)2 −1 ⇐ ρQ2 ≡
Q f i2
W2Lh
|t
(17)
After the wage cut the profit ratio of firm1 is 0.50 and that of firm2 is -0.25. The
initial profit ratio was zero for both firms. In order to restore these initial conditions
firm2 has no other option but to lower its own wage rate and to bring back rW to
unity.
6 Crossover exploitation
A general wage cut lowers the market clearing price and leaves the absolute amount
of profits in both firms at zero if the expenditure ratio is unity, rE=1, and if the
wage ratio is unity, rW=1, according to (16). It has, by consequence, no effect on
the profit ratio as (17) makes clear. For any given expenditure ratio the profit ratio
of both firms depends on the wage ratio rW. The absolute magnitude of a uniform
wage rate has no effect on the individual profit ratios, only the wage ratio rW has.
From this follows that a general wage cut can have no effect on employment if the
decision to hire more workers depends on the individual firm’s profit ratio.
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The case is entirely different when wage rate changes are not uniform. From
the perspective of political economy the facts are deceivingly clear for participants
and outside observers alike: firm1 slashes the wage rate and thereby raises profits
according to (16) and Figure 1b. This looks like exploitation and fits the time-
honored stereotype of wages and profits as antagonists:
Further, Ricardo discussed at considerable length the tension between
the workers and the capitalists, in that he claimed consistently that the
rate of wages and the rate of profit varied inversely. His proposition
at the beginning of his chapter “On Profits” that “profits would be
high or low in proportion as wages were low or high” . . . came back
repeatedly to prominence. (Vickers, 1995, p. 62), see also (Nadal,
2004, pp. 193-197)
This, though, is parochial realism and Marx, among many others, borrowed it
unwarily from Ricardo. The complete picture reveals that firm1 is better off to the
disadvantage of firm2 and the workers of firm2 are better off to the disadvantage of
the workers of firm1 because at a lower market price they absorb a bigger share of
output with their unaltered income. The situation of the business sector as a whole
is unchanged and the same is true for the household sector. If there is exploitation it
happens within the sectors. A partial wage rate change leads only to a redistribution
of profits between the capitalists and of output between the workers. Profit has
no effect on the distribution of output, only profit distribution and the spending
out of distributed profit has (see Kakarot-Handtke, 2011d, pp. 11-12). As long
as nothing is spent out of distributed profits the workers get the whole product.
Neither the length of the working day nor the wage rate plays any role, except
for the redistribution of profit within the business sector and of output within the
household sector (cf. Marx 1990a, p. 680 about the form of appearances). From
the structural axiom set follows that profits (7) are determined by the expenditure
ratio and the distributed profit ratio. The real shares of output are determined in the
spheres of income and expenditure and not, as classical, Marxian and neoclassical
economists in conspicuous unanimity maintain, in the sphere of production. All
these approaches are based upon the ‘axiom of reals’ (Minsky, 1984, p. 454) and
therefore share a common error.
The classical antagonism of wages and profits is an optical illusion. This, of
course, has a bearing on the political notion of classes. There is no distributional
conflict about output between profits and wages. When classes are defined according
to these categories the actual conflict appears within the classes in the form of more
or less intensive competition. When, in the limiting case, there are two groups
of workers and two groups of capitalists and the first group of capitalists exploits
the first group of workers, then the exploiters objectively act in the interest of the
second group of workers whatever their own subjective motives may be. The second
group of workers has no economic interest to overcome the discrimination of the
first group, yet the second group of capitalists has indeed because of (17). In any
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event it is more to the facts to substitute the commonplace notion of exploitation by
the notion of crossover exploitation within the business and the household sector.
The myopic agents, workers and capitalists alike, are blind to these interdepen-
dencies and therefore prone to the fallacy of composition, that is, to the logically
inadmissible generalization of partial effects. This fallacious generalization has
the compelling logic of the profit and loss account and the irrefutable empirical
evidence of firm1 on its side. Indeed, what could be more convincing? Wages down,
profits up. It works. The invisible redistribution of profit and output is anonymously
effected behind the agents’ back by the market clearing price. Therefore all firms
tend to act like firm1. If they are all successful the structural logic ensures that at
the temporary end of the adaptation process the profit ratios are the same as at the
beginning but the wage rate, the price and absolute profits are at a lower level. The
market turns common sense on its head.
The workers on the other hand need not resort to class struggle if they want to
bring profits down to zero. A really effective alternative follows from (7):
ρE =
1
1+ρD
⇔ Q f i = 0 |t (18)
If the distributed profit ratio is greater than zero the expenditure ratio has to be
below unity to satisfy the zero profit condition (18). That is, saving can wipe out
overall profits in the pure consumption economy. The same holds for the investment
economy (Kakarot-Handtke, 2011a, pp. 18-19).
7 Surplus value
The real wage follows from (11) as:
W
P
=
R
ρE (1+ρD)
if ρX = 1 |t (19)
The real wage rises with productivity and falls with an increase of the expendi-
ture ratio and/or the distributed profit ratio. Since there is no capital the real wage
cannot have anything to do with the marginal productivity of capital. It has nothing
to do with the marginal productivity of labor either. The real wage is a structural
fact. Distribution is neither dependent on a (non-existing) production function with
convenient formal properties nor on the (irrelevant) behavioral hypothesis of profit
maximization.
Misery due to a low real wage therefore has basically two structural axiomatic
reasons: a low productivity or a high distributed profit ratio, if the product market is
cleared and the household sector’s budget is balanced. In the first case capitalists
can hardly be blamed. Productivity depends on ‘Nature’ and the historically given
technology, but profit distribution is at their discretion. The distributed profit ratio
is zero if all profits are retained. Retained profits facilitate investment and this in
turn contributes to capital accumulation and subsequently to productivity increases.
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Once this process is set in motion the workers have both, the full consumption goods
output in each period and a continuously rising real wage. This, of course, is the
panglossian scenario. If, to the contrary, profits are fully distributed and distributed
profits are fully spent the real wage falls below productivity. The gap depends on
the relation of distributed profits to wage income. Whether this gap is large enough
to make a real difference to the individual worker cannot be known a priori.
Let us now, in contrast to Marx’s dialectical characterization, define the surplus
value consistently in structural axiomatic terms. We start with the surplus product
of one hour’s work which is defined as difference between productivity and the real
wage:
σ ≡ R−W
P
|t (20)
From the surplus product per hour we arrive at the total surplus product by
multiplication with total working hours:
σL≡ RL−WL
P
≡ O− YW
P
|t (21)
To get the total surplus value s the total surplus product is valued with the market
price P and this gives under the condition of market clearing rX=1 in conjunction
with (4):
s≡ σLP≡C−YW ≡ Q f i if ρX = 1 |t (22)
In the structural axiomatic context total surplus value is by definition identical
with financial profit. It is therefore misleading to say that ‘surplus value takes the
money form of profits’ (Desai, 2008, p. 4). Both, profit and surplus value, are
appearances of the actual configuration of the expenditure ratio and the distributed
profit ratio. As joint appearances they are uno actu given by definition. The
definition of surplus product as a certain part of the hourly output has no causal
significance whatsoever. This entails that the transformation problem is an empty
question. Surplus value is not produced on the shop floor and then transformed
into profits in the product market. As Marx put it in volume III: ‘Profit, as we are
originally faced with it, is thus the same thing as surplus-value, . . . ’ (Marx, 1990b,
p. 127, italics added).
The crucial theoretical difference is, first, that the real wage cannot be inter-
preted as some socially given minimum that is necessary for the reproduction of
the working class. The real wage rises by and large with productivity and this
explains why the capitalist mode of production does not lead to (absolute or relative)
immiserization (related to a given population, of course). Second, neither the surplus
value nor profit is an indicator of commonplace exploitation.
When it is assumed as a theoretical limiting case that the wage earners always
spend more than their income in each period and the receivers of fully distributed
profits always save their income and consistently invest all their savings in the shares
and bonds of the business sector then wages earners get the whole output and the
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receivers of distributed profits finally own the whole business sector. This follows
logically from the structural axiom set and this is by and large what can be observed.
The question of ownership, though, has nothing to do with profit origination in the
money economy that concerns us here. The profit formula is exactly the same in an
economy with cooperative ownership.
Marx regarded profit as the raison d’être of the capitalist system, which is good
old commonplace economics, but he could not transcend appearances theoretically.
From the structural axiomatic perspective the concept of surplus value is formally
redundant. Just because it is by definition identical with financial profit it cannot
explain it. Profit is explained by (7).
Marx himself considered the discovery of the concept of surplus-value,
representing the sum total of profits, interests and rents of all parts of
the bourgeois class, as his main theoretical discovery. (Mandel, 1990,
p, 51)
With surplus value we have, in fact, discovered nothing about reality, but about the
logical implications of our foundational concepts. It is good to know that profit and
surplus value is formally the same thing, hence we can drop the latter without any
fear of scientific loss.
It is not necessary to scrutinize Marx’s gigantic theoretical superstructure further,
because it is obvious at this point that the pivotal concept of surplus value lacks
a sound theoretical foundation. Marx’s theory of exploitation, distribution and
insoluble inner contradiction remains, the dialectical method notwithstanding – or
just because of it, on the descriptive surface. However, as Marx, the sociologist and
historian, well knew, in the social realm appearance is not less real than essence
(Mandel, 1990, p. 20). In fact, it is even more ‘real’.
That in their appearances things often represent themselves in an in-
verted form is pretty well-known in every science, except political
economy. (Marx, 1990a, p. 667)
Marx wanted to create not a flimsy platform of rhetorical invective, ‘but the rock-like
foundation of scientific truth’ (Mandel, 1990, p. 17). This distinguishes him from
the vulgar economists then and now.
. . . if economic theory is viewed as an exercise in story-telling, then
the stories economists tell will be influenced by the social and political
environment. A change of environment could easily give rise to to a
burst of new story telling, and the grandest theory of all – the theory
of income distribution – could then be subject to a wave of re-telling.
(Palley, 2003, p. 185)
If economic theory is viewed as an exercise in axiomatic logic a change from talking
to thinking could have an even more beneficial effect.
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8 Conclusions
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
formal reconstruction of the evolving money economy and applies these to Marx’s
approach. The main results of the structural axiomatic inquiry are:
• Overall profit is determined by the expenditure ratio and the distributed profit
ratio.
• Profit is not connected to a factor input.
• Profit belongs entirely to the nominal sphere, in a real model it cannot exist.
• The real shares of output are determined in the spheres of income and expen-
diture and not, as classical, Marxian and neoclassical economists maintain, in
the sphere of production.
• The real wage is a structural fact. It has nothing to do with the marginal
productivity of labor or capital.
• When the economy consists at the outset of two firms, the profit of each firm
depends positively on the the overall expenditure ratio and negatively on the
relation of the own wage rate and the wage rate of the other firm. Hence
each firm experiences immediately the repercussions of its own actions and
is directly affected by those of its competitor. Even if the number of firms is
very much increased, ceteris paribus is inadmissible.
• If firm1 slashes the wage rate its profit increases. The complete picture,
though, reveals that firm1 is better off to the disadvantage of firm2 and the
workers of firm2 are better off to the disadvantage of the workers of firm1.
The situation of the business sector as a whole is unchanged and the same
is true for the household sector. If there is exploitation it happens within the
sectors.
• The classical antagonism of wages and profits is an optical illusion. The
commonsense notion of exploitation has to be replaced by the notion of
crossover exploitation within the business and the household sector.
• In the structural axiomatic context total surplus value is by definition identical
with financial profit. Both, profit and surplus value, are appearances of the
actual configuration of the expenditure ratio and the distributed profit ratio.
Therefore surplus value cannot explain profit.
Marx’s theory of exploitation, distribution and insoluble inner contradiction remains,
the dialectical method notwithstanding – or just because of it, on the descriptive
surface.
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